The present paper uses a setting where …rms commit to environmental R&D expenditure that reduces their emission levels before the regulator sets the emission tax. It examines two scenarios with respect to the organization of environmental R&D: (i) independent R&D and (ii) an industry-wide environmental R&D Cartel (ERC). In the …rst scenario (1) …rms choose their emission-reducing R&D noncooperatively, (2) the regulator sets the emission tax and (3) …rms compete in the market by choosing quantities. In the second scenario both the second and third stages remain the same, however, in the …rst stage …rms form an industry-wide ERC that cooperatively undertakes environmental R&D. Thus, in both R&D scenarios, the regulator follows a time-consistent policy; this corresponds to the case where the regulator is unable to commit credibly to the emission tax.
Introduction
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of voluntary agreements as an environmental policy tool, the majority of these aiming to reduce CO 2 emissions in relation to global warming. The excellent survey by Brau and Carraro (1998) provides a comprehensive review of recent research in the area.
Rational …rms, anticipating a government's or regulator's actions -usually in the form of introducing or increasing emission taxation, have an incentive to voluntary reduce their emission levels so that their tax bill gets reduced. (Conrad (1998) and Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1998) ). Conrad (1998) considers a strategic trade setting where …rms commit to abatement e¤orts that will reduce the polluting productive input in anticipation of an emission tax set by competing governments. He …nds that …rms sacri…ce pro…t and reduce production and thus use less of the polluting input and are rewarded by a less strict policy in the form of lower emission taxes (this constitutes a voluntary approach). Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1998) analyze the case of a polluting monopolist who faces a government setting an emission tax, taking into account the dynamic inconsistency problem (a policy is inconsistent in a dynamic sense if an optimal action de…ned at time t ceases to be optimal at time T (T > t) even with no change in the information structure). They show that the optimal time consistent tax is always lower than the optimal tax in the case of pre-commitment so that, as a consequence, voluntary environmental innovation is always higher when there is no government pre-commitment (but welfare may be lower). This means that in the case of no-commitment, voluntary approaches (VA) would be more prevalent despite a reduction in social welfare. In both papers the VA is acting as a pre-commitment device which solves the dynamic inconsistency problem. In the present paper, we consider a similar setting allowing for oligopolistic interaction in a closed economy and concentrate on the case of a non-committal government to capture the VA element. The question we address relates to the organizational structure of environmental R&D, cooperative versus independent, and how this relates to the relative performance in terms of abatement (environmental innovation) and social welfare.
We examine two scenarios with respect to the organization of environmental R&D: (i) independent R&D and (ii) an industry-wide environmental R&D cartel (ERC). In the …rst scenario the structure of the multi-stage game is as follows: (1) …rms choose their emission-reducing R&D non-cooperatively, (2) the regulator (or government) sets the emission tax and (3) …rms compete in the market by choosing quantities. In the second scenario both the second and third stages remain the same, however, in the …rst stage …rms form an industry-wide R&D Cartel that cooperatively undertakes environmental R&D. 1 Thus, in both R&D scenarios, the regulator follows a time-consistent policy.
We show that, contrary to the conventional presumption, an ERC can be detrimental to both emission reduction and social welfare. In particular, for relatively small damages, environmental innovation is higher in the case of an ERC compared to independent R&D, while for relatively large damages the opposite is true. The same ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare. However, …rms always have an incentive to be part of an industrywide ERC as this increases their pro…tability.
The Model
We consider a duopoly where …rms produce a homogeneous good under a linear demand speci…cation p = a ¡ Q; Q = q i + q j ; i 6 = j; i; j = 1; 2, where a is a measure of market size. Production generates pollution which is taxed at the rate t on emissions while …rm i can reduce its tax burden by undertaking environmental innovation (or abatement -we will use these terms interchangeably) z i to reduce its emissions. The cost function for …rm i is given by c(q i ; z i ) = cq i +°z
where c is the unit cost of production (a > c), i.e. there are constant returns to scale and°captures the e¢ciency of the abatement technology. Notice that abatement is characterized by decreasing returns as we assume°> 0. Firm i's emissions are given by e i (q i ; z i ) = q i ¡ z i ¡¯z j , 0 ·¯· 1 , i.e. there are knowledge spillovers in environmental R&D in that a …rm bene…ts not only from its own R&D e¤ort but also from its rival's e¤ort by an amount¯. Thus, by investing and amount°z 2 i 2 in environmental R&D …rm i can reduce its emissions by z i +¯z j -this latter term represents the e¤ective R&D for …rm i. Given pollution, the extent of damage is captured via a quadratic damage function, D = 1 2 dE 2 , where E = e i +e j is total emissions and d is proportional to marginal damage. To guarantee an interior solution for abatement we assume that d > 1 2 . In the sequel we compare the two alternative R&D scenarios: independent R&D and environmental R&D cartel (ERC). In the third stage, …rm i chooses output to maximize pro…t
The relevant f.o.c. yields
, and equilibrium pro…t
Note that a …rm's output decreases in the emission tax.
Regulator's choice of emission tax (Stage 2)
In the second stage, the regulator sets the emission tax, t, to maximize social welfare, expressed as the sum of producer and consumer surplus minus environmental damages,
which, after some manipulation yields
From (1) notice that
< 0 , so that a greater investment in R&D will lead to a lower emission tax; this captures the voluntary approach element in the model. Using (1) in the expression for output and pro…t we obtain
and
In the …rst stage of the game the two …rms choose their environmental R&D anticipating the choice of tax by the regulator and the subsequent product market competition. Each …rm maximizes second-stage pro…ts as given by (3), so that the relevant …rst-order condition is
In the symmetric equilibrium, z i = z j = z nc , the solution of the f.o.c. yields the equilibrium level of abatement
Using (4) into (1) and (2) we obtain the equilibrium emission tax and quantity per …rm respectively
Further,
This concludes the analysis of the non-cooperative R&D scenario. 
Cooperative R&D -Environmental R&D Cartel
Stages 2 and 3 remain the same. However, in the …rst stage the two …rms choose their environmental R&D cooperatively, i.e. they choose z i ; i = 1; 2, to maximize joint pro…ts. Notice that this is an environmental R&D cartel (ERC) as it operates with the same spillover as the independent …rms, i.e. …rms coordinate their R&D but do not share information fully -in the case where …rms would share information completely we would have an environmental research joint venture (ERJV), i.e.¯= 1 (see Kamien et al. (1992) for more details on the terminology used, adapted here for the environmental context). Thus, in stage 1 …rms maximize
where ¼ i refers to the second-stage pro…t as given by (3). The …rst-order conditions require that
; deriving the f.o.c. and then setting z i = z j = z erc ; yields the symmetric equilibrium values 2 ,
Using (9) into the relevant expressions for the emission tax and the quantity produced we obtain
Furthermore, pro…ts per …rm and total welfare are expressed as
Having described the cooperative R&D scenario we proceed to a comparison of the two di¤erent forms of R&D organization. 2 The second-order conditions are satis…ed. 7
A Comparison: Independent R&D versus ERC
First, we compare the R&D levels (abatement), z erc and z nc . From (9) and (4)
where '´d(3 ¡2d)(1 +¯) (10) and (5) we have
We then state and prove the following:
the equilibrium abatement in the ERC is always greater than the non-cooperative equilibrium abatement, z erc > z nc , while the optimal emission tax in the case of an ERC is lower than the optimal emission tax in the non-cooperative equilibrium, t erc < t nc ; (ii) for a given d, d > 3 2 , there exists a critical value for the R&D e¢ciency parameter,°, such that z erc > z nc if and only if°>°and z erc < z nc if and only if°<°. Further, for°>°, t erc < t nc and for°<°; t erc > t nc . The critical value°is decreasing in the spillover,¯, and increasing in the damage parameter, d.
and for a given°, there is a critical value 3 d such that for d > d, the equilibrium abatement in the ERC is lower than the noncooperative equilibrium abatement, z erc < z nc and for d < d, z erc > z nc . Further, for d > d, t erc > t nc while for d < d, t erc < t nc .
Proof From (14) and (15), z erc ? z nc and t erc 7 t nc respectively, if and only by assumption) and thus, ' > 0.
> 0, as the critical R&D e¢ciency parameter. Note that @'=@°= 2(2d Figure 1 illustrates the above proposition and the corollary.
[ Figure 1 ]
Thus, according to Proposition 1, for relatively small environmental damages (
) abatement is higher with the environmental R&D cartel irrespective of the extent of R&D e¢ciency (part i). However, when environmental damages are larger, d > 3 2 , the comparison between the two di¤erent forms of R&D organization is less clear-cut. For a given d it hinges on the e¢ciency of R&D: for relatively e¢cient R&D (°<°) abatement is lower with the environmental R&D cartel while the opposite is true for ine¢cient R&D (°>°), as expected intuitively. Further, as the spillover increases the critical value for the R&D e¢ciency parameter decreases so that the ERC outperforms the independent R&D set-up in a wider class of cases (part ii). More interestingly, for a given°, for relative large damages (d > d > 3 2 ) abatement is lower with the environmental R&D cartel while the opposite is true for small damages (
The opposite results hold for the optimal emission tax -this is a direct implication of the voluntary approach element, @z @t < 0. Our intuition for proposition 1 proceeds as follows: Consider the case of no spillovers for given R&D e¢ciency (…xed°). In order to reduce its tax bill, a …rm will increase its environmental R&D so as to induce a lower emission tax from the regulator; however, each …rm will reason this way and will expect its rival …rm to do the job, given the public good nature of emission reduction, resulting in underinvestment in R&D. When …rms coordinate their R&D within an ERC, this free-riding aspect becomes internalized and …rms will spend more relative to the case of independent R&D and will generate more abatement. However, as damage increases, independent …rms stand to loose relatively more from a higher emission tax and thus for high values of d we observe that they will do more R&D than …rms in the ERC. Taking account of the spillover, in the case of independent R&D there is further underinvestment due to the appropriability problem -this explains why as the spillover increases the …rms in an ERC will undertake more R&D than the independent …rms (in …gure 1 the dark area decreases as the spillover increases). It is clear though that an ERC promotes environmental innovation only when damage is relatively small (and for a given value of the spillover).
Next, we compare equilibrium pro…ts per …rm. Using (7) and (12) after some manipulation we obtain
where
We then state Proposition 2 Firm pro…tability is higher in an environmental R&D cartel (ERC) than in R&D competition, ¼ erc > ¼ nc .
It is obvious that it is privately pro…table for a …rm to participate in an environmental R&D cartel whatever the environmental damage (and emission tax); i.e. a …rm has a clear incentive to participate in an ERC. 4 This is expected given that within an ERC each …rm is maximizing joint pro…ts by choice of its environmental R&D.
Finally, we compare total welfare under the two forms of R&D organization. The following proposition summarizes the results. total welfare in the ERC is always greater than in the non-cooperative equilibrium, T W erc > T W nc ; (ii) when d > 3 2 , there is a d such that for all d > d, total welfare is lower in an environmental R&D cartel relative to environmental R&D competition T W erc < T W nc and for all Proof From (8) with (13) we obtain after some manipulations
where > 0 , ´2d
nd ' has been de…ned previously. It is then obvious that sign[T W erc ¡ T W nc ] = sign('). We can then use the formal similarity with the proof of Proposition 1 (parts (i) and (iii)) to obtain the result. ¥ According to Proposition 3, an environmental R&D cartel can be detrimental to social welfare despite being desirable from the …rms' point of view; this is so for relative large environmental damages and e¢cient R&D. The intuition for this result is a direct implication of the result on the relative ranking of environmental R&D, contained in proposition 1. Note also, when = 1, the ERC (which in this case coincides with an ERJV) outperforms the independent R&D case for any degree of environmental damage -this is because it internalizes totally both the free-rider and the appropriability problems.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have addressed the question of whether the organization of environmental R&D is important in relation to emission reduction and the associated total welfare. This has been examined in the context of a voluntary approach formulation captured by the inability of the regulator/government to commit to the environmental policy instrument (emission tax) credibly. It has been shown that, for relatively small damages, environmental innovation is higher in the case of an environmental R&D cartel (ERC) compared to independent R&D, while for relatively large damages the opposite is true. The same ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare. In addition, the time-consistent tax is lower for an ERC compared to independent R&D in the case of small damages and the reverse holds for large damages. It would seem then, in summary, that ERCs perform better than a non-cooperative R&D organization only when environmental damage is low. We should note though that these results have been obtained in the context of a duopolisitic market. Extending the analysis to an n-…rm oligopoly would exacerbate the free-rider problem so that cooperation in the form of an environmental R&D cartel would most probably result in higher abatement and welfare in a wider class of cases; however, with more than two …rms we would have to consider cooperation encompassing less than the total number of …rms in the market and examine the e¤ects on insiders (cooperating …rms) and outsiders (noncooperating …rms) and how the interplay of these sets of …rms a¤ects total welfare and so on. Moreover, issues of multiple, competing ERCs would need to be addressed. We leave these interesting topics for future research. 
